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8 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

9 COALITION FOR FAIR, LEGAL AND
10 ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSIT, et al.,

11 Petitioners and Plaintiffs,

12 vs.

13 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
14 et al.,

15 Respondents and Defendants;

16 APPLE, INC., et al.,

17 Intervenors.

18
19 SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL
TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, et al.,

20 Real Parties in Interest and Defendants.
21

Case No.: CPF-14513627

**PETITIONERS' TRIAL BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE**

Dept: 608

Judge: Hon. Garret L. Wong

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 The City and County of San Francisco (“City”) has authorized a private shuttle bus project
3 (“Shuttle Project”), involving over 35,000 boardings each day (Administrative Record page 228
4 (“AR228”)), with absolutely no environmental review under the California Environmental Quality
5 Act (“CEQA”). Pub. Res. Code (“PRC”) Sect. 21000, et seq. The Shuttle Project is similar in size
6 to the entire CalTrain system or an entire medium-sized transit agency. AR2205.

7 The Shuttle Project is preempted by State law. The State Vehicle Code makes it unlawful
8 for private vehicles to stop in red bus zones, which are reserved solely for “common carriers.”
9 Vehicle Code § 22500(e)(i). The City’s ordinance expressly allows the private shuttles to stop in red
10 bus zones. San Francisco Transportation Code § 914 (AR197-212). This constitutes a direct
11 conflict between State law and local ordinances. The local ordinance must yield to State law.

12 Undisputed expert evidence in the record indicates that the Shuttle Project will have
13 unmitigated environmental impacts, including, but not limited to the following:

- 14 • air pollution and related cancer risks above CEQA significance thresholds due to the fact that
15 virtually all of the buses operate on diesel fuel rather than clean fuels (AR1385);
- 16 • interference with the flow of San Francisco Municipal Transportation Authority (“MUNI” or
17 “SFMTA”) buses, since the private shuttles use MUNI “red zones” in violation of state law
18 (AR82, 126);
- 19 • pedestrian safety impacts since the shuttles block MUNI zones, forcing MUNI buses to load and
20 unload in traffic lanes (AR67, 82, 1415);
- 21 • interference with bicycle lanes, which are often blocked by the shuttles (AR82, 1415);
- 22 • noise impacts in quiet residential areas above relevant CEQA thresholds (AR1423); and
- 23 • displacement of low-income communities by higher-paid workers who commute on the private
24 shuttles (AR1408-1413; 1499-1518).

25 These impacts have been documented not only by independent experts, but also by the
26 City’s own Budget and Legislative Analyst (“BLA”). AR1672-1707. Despite these impacts, the
27 City refused to conduct any review of the Shuttle Project under CEQA. Instead, the City exempted
28 the Project entirely from all CEQA review, pursuant to the Class 6 exemption for “Information
Collection.” 14 Cal.Code Regs. (“CCR”) 15306; AR2. As discussed below, the Class 6 exemption
does not apply on its face because the Shuttle Project goes far beyond mere information collection.

1 The Class 6 exemption is also improper because there is a “fair argument” based on expert evidence
2 that the Project will have significant adverse environmental impacts due to unusual circumstances.

3 Dozens of well-respected individuals and organizations commented at public hearings on the
4 Project and requesting CEQA review, including former City Supervisors (AR3217, 3221), the
5 Harvey Milk LGBT Democratic Club (AR3186), the San Francisco Tenants Union (AR3216),
6 Senior and Disability Action (AR3221), the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) Local
7 1021 (AR3181), the AIDS Housing Alliance director (AR3189), as well as many long-time
8 residents of San Francisco. AR3150-3222. The Petitioner Coalition represents hundreds of San
9 Francisco residents who are facing the direct impacts of the Shuttle Project, including air pollution,
10 traffic congestion, MUNI delays, bicycle lane blockage and displacement. The Coalition wants the
11 City to conduct CEQA review of the Shuttle Project so that the City will be legally mandated to
12 impose all feasible mitigation measures.

13 CEQA review would provide an orderly process to review the Project’s environmental
14 impacts, and to require the City to impose all feasible mitigation measures and alternatives to
15 reduce those impacts. *Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay v. Bd. of Port Comm’rs.* (2001) 91 Cal. App.
16 4th 1344, 1354; 14 CCR §15002(a); Pub.Res.Code (“PRC”) § 21081. Instead, the City has
17 embarked on its own informal analysis, unfettered by any of the legal requirements of CEQA.
18 While the City intends to analyze the impacts of the program, in the absence of CEQA, there is no
19 legal requirement for the City to impose any mitigation measures or alternatives. CEQA does not
20 allow such a “CEQA-light” procedure. *Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Com.* (1997) 16
21 Cal.4th 105, 110 (agency may not replace formal requirements of CEQA with alternative
22 environmental review procedure under Endangered Species Act).

23 At the same time that the City has exempted the Shuttle Project from all CEQA review, it is
24 conducting full CEQA review of MUNI’s own Transit Effectiveness Project (AR3151), which
25 involves rerouting certain MUNI lines to improve efficiency. See, [www.sfmta.com/news/project-](http://www.sfmta.com/news/project-updates/final-tep-eir-documents-now-available)
26 [updates/final-tep-eir-documents-now-available](http://www.sfmta.com/news/project-updates/final-tep-eir-documents-now-available). Certainly, private shuttle operators should be held
27 to the same environmental standards as the City’s own transit provider, MUNI.

28 **II. FACTS**

A. Commuter shuttle history in San Francisco

For nearly 30 years, private shuttles have been providing intra-city transportation services
for hospitals, schools, service organizations, and private employers. AR222. Starting in 2004,

1 private employers began offering regional commuter shuttle services to their employees who live in
2 San Francisco and work in locations outside of San Francisco, particularly in Silicon Valley.

3 AR222. The number of private commuter shuttles operating in San Francisco has grown
4 dramatically in recent years, and the City expects that this rapid growth will continue. AR33.

5 To pick up and drop off passengers, commuter shuttles typically use red-curbed bus zones
6 used by MUNI buses and trolleys and some white-curbed passenger loading zones. AR223. The
7 California Vehicle Code § 22500(e)(i) prohibits the use of red-curbed zones by private vehicles
8 such as the shuttles. Prior to adoption of the Project, it also violated the San Francisco Charter for
9 shuttles to stop in MUNI zones. AR1682-1684. Despite the fact that the shuttles were illegally
10 stopping at red-zones, the practice has been allowed for years, with only a handful¹ of citations
11 issued by SFMTA and the Police Department. AR224. *According to Asst. City Attorney David
Greenburg, “all use of City bus zones by private shuttles to date has been in violation of the
California Vehicle Code.”* AR233 (emphasis added).

12 Currently the City estimates that on an average weekday, these commuter shuttles have
13 more than 35,000 boardings on more than 350 shuttles at 200 MUNI bus zones throughout San
14 Francisco. AR 228. This is similar in size to CalTrain or a medium-sized transit agency. AR 2205.
15 At peak locations, private commuter shuttles outnumbered MUNI operations 1.5 to 1. AR 3033. As
16 the number of shuttles increased, so did the number of impacts created by the shuttles, including
17 MUNI delays, traffic congestion, and pedestrian and bicycle safety risks, among others. AR223.

18 **B. The Shuttle Project**

19 The Shuttle Project is an 18-month pilot permit program that allows permitted private
20 commuter shuttle buses to stop in approximately 200 designated MUNI bus stops throughout San
21 Francisco to load and unload passengers. AR57, 59. The Project contains no limits on the number
22 of shuttles that can register for a permit under the Project. See, AR59, 137-139.

23 There are significant differences between private commuter shuttles and MUNI vehicles.
24 For instance, the large motor coach carriers used as shuttles are much larger than typical MUNI
25 buses. AR962. Shuttles used for regional commuting are typically larger than those used for intra-
26 city transit, and usually seat 52 to 81 people. AR99. Larger shuttles, such as those used in inter-

27 ¹ Between January 1, 2011 and February 25, 2014, only an estimated 45 or 0.3% of the 13,385
28 citations issued for illegally stopping in a bus zone were issued to shuttle bus providers or
companies that owned their own shuttle fleet. (AR 233.)

1 city transit, tend to have longer idling times than MUNI vehicles because it takes longer for
2 passengers to board and alight because of the size of the bus, their high floor configuration, and use
3 of a single door. AR239. Additionally, MUNI prioritizes low-emission vehicles such as battery-
4 electric vehicles or diesel with advanced exhaust treatment, with a goal of moving towards zero
5 emissions by 2020. AR970. There is no such goal or policy for the private shuttles, and almost all
6 use conventional diesel engines. Moreover, while MUNI does not allow its own vehicles to idle for
7 more than three minutes, private shuttles are allowed to idle for up to five minutes.² AR970.

8 As part of the Project, the city solicited input from the shuttle service providers and the
9 public about which stops to include in the Project. SFMTA then selected approximately 200 Muni
10 stops for shared use. AR32. While the initial Muni stops have now been chosen, the Shuttle Project
11 contains no limit on the number of stops or the number of shuttles that may be permitted. Requests
12 for additional shared MUNI stops can be submitted for consideration by the SFMTA on a rolling
13 basis. AR2827. The City has made clear that the intent is for the Shuttle Project to grow over time.
14 AR1064.

15 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

16 A. Preemption

17 The determination of whether the San Francisco Transportation Code §914 is preempted by
18 state law is a pure question of law, and it is therefore determined *de novo* by the Court, without
19 deference to the agency. *M & B Constr. v. Yuba County Water Agency* (1999) 68 Cal. App. 4th
20 1353, 1359 (“The interpretation and application of a statutory scheme to an undisputed set of facts
21 is a question of law . . . which is subject to *de novo* review on appeal.”). The Court reviews
22 questions of law *de novo* because “the ultimate resolution of . . . legal questions rests with the
23 courts,” not with agencies. *Yamaha Corp. v. State Bd. of Equal.* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 13.

24 B. CEQA

25 The standard of review in an action challenging a CEQA exemption is whether there has
26 been a prejudicial abuse of discretion. *See* PRC § 21168.5; *Dunn-Edwards Corp. v. Bay Area Air*
27 *Quality Mgmt. Dist.* (1992) 9 Cal. App. 4th 644, 656. “[R]eversal of the City’s action here is
28 appropriate only if (a) the City, in finding the proposed project categorically exempt, did not
proceed in the manner required by law, or (b) substantial evidence fails to support that finding.”

² One resident reported to the SFMTA that an Apple shuttle bus idles its engine on Funston Avenue for almost two hours every day. AR2899.

1 *Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley* (2015)(“*Berkeley Hillside*”) 60 Cal.4th 1086,
2 1109-1110. The Coalition contends that the City “failed to proceed in a manner required by law”
3 because it failed to conduct any CEQA review for the Shuttle Project.

4 The question of “whether the Commission’s activity fell within the express terms of a
5 categorical exemption,” is a question of law subject to independent, or *de novo* review. *Berkeley*
6 *Hillside*, 60 Cal. 4th at 1109; *San Lorenzo Valley Comty. Advocates v. San Lorenzo Valley Unif.*
7 *Sch. Dist.* (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1375 (“[Q]uestions of interpretation or application of the
8 requirements of CEQA are matters of law. [Citations.] Thus, for example, interpreting the scope of
9 a CEQA exemption presents ‘a question of law, subject to *de novo* review by this court.’
10 [Citations].”) Erroneous reliance by the City on a categorical exemption constitutes a prejudicial
11 abuse of discretion and a violation of CEQA. *Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel*
12 *Basin Watermaster* (1997) (“*Azusa*”) 52 Cal. App. 4th 1165, 1192.

13 If the Project falls within the scope of the exemption, then the exemption can still be
14 overcome if there is a “fair argument” that the Project may have significant impacts due to “unusual
15 circumstances.” 14 CCR. §15300.2(c). “The determination as to whether there are ‘unusual
16 circumstances’ ... is reviewed under section 21168.5’s substantial evidence prong. However, an
17 agency’s finding as to whether unusual circumstances give rise to ‘a reasonable possibility that the
18 activity will have a significant effect on the environment’ ... is reviewed to determine whether the
19 agency, in applying the fair argument standard, ‘proceeded in [the] manner required by law.’”
20 *Berkeley Hillside*, 60 Cal. 4th at 1114.

21 IV. ARGUMENT

22 A. The Shuttle Project is preempted by the California Vehicle Code and its adoption 23 violates the California Constitution.

24 The Shuttle Project enacts local legislation in conflict with and preempted by state law, and
25 is therefore invalid. A charter city, such as San Francisco, may not enact an ordinance in conflict
26 with state law over matters that are of statewide concern. *Bishop v. San Jose* (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56,
27 61-2; *Pines v. City of Santa Monica* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 656, 659 (“legislation in an area of statewide
28 concern preempts conflicting regulation by a charter city”). A charter city is authorized by the State
Constitution to “make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs.”
Cal. Const., Art. XI, § 5, subd. (a). “Under this provision, ordinances enacted in a charter city
relating to matters which are purely municipal affairs prevail over state laws covering the same
subject... ‘As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain

1 subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their
2 charters...” *Comm. of Seven Thousand v. Sup. Ct. (City of Irvine)* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 505.

3 The threshold inquiry is whether a conflict actually exists between a city ordinance and a
4 state law. *Johnson v. Bradley* (1991) 4 Cal.4th 389, 400. If a conflict exists, and the subject matter
5 of the law is of statewide concern, then the state law preempts the city law. *Id.* at 399. “Any doubt
6 as to whether a matter is of concern to both municipalities and the state must be resolved in favor of
7 the legislative authority of the state.” *Baggett v. Gates* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 140.

8 **1. A conflict exists between San Francisco Transportation Code §914 and
9 California Vehicle Code § 22500(e)(i).**

10 An actual conflict exists between the San Francisco Transportation Code §914 (“Sec. 914”) and State law. California Vehicle Code § 22500(e) provides that:

11 No person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle whether attended or unattended,
12 except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the
13 directions of a peace officer or official traffic control device, in any of the following places:

- 14 (i) Except as provided under Section 22500.5,³ alongside curb space authorized for
15 the loading and unloading of passengers of a bus engaged as a common carrier⁴ in
16 local transportation when indicated by a sign or red paint on the curb erected or
17 painted by local authorities pursuant to an ordinance.

18 In direct conflict with the State Vehicle Code’s prohibition against private buses stopping in
19 public “red-curb” bus stops, the Sec. 914 expressly *allows* the same action. AR197-212, 203. Sec.
20 914 provides that a shuttle bus bearing a valid permit placard is allowed to stop at any stop
21 designated under the program, including designated red curbs. Sec. 914(f)(2); AR203.

22 Moreover, California Vehicle Code § 42001.5 imposes a minimum \$250.00 fine on any
23 person convicted of violating Vehicle Code § 22500. Vehicle Code § 42001.5(b) provides that the
24 fine cannot be suspended, except that the court can waive anything above \$100.00, meaning the
25 minimum fine allowed under state law is \$100.00. In contrast, the Shuttle Project allows private
26 shuttle operators to stop in public bus stops if they make a payment of one dollar (\$1.00)⁵, an action
27 that is in direct conflict with State law. Sec. 914(h)(2); AR206.

28 _____
³ Vehicle Code § 22500.5 refers to school buses owned by or operated for a public school district.

⁴ Section 211 of the Cal. Public Utilities Code defines “common carriers” as entities that provide transportation to the public for compensation, and the City acknowledges that this does not include the private commuter shuttle buses at issue in this action. AR272.

⁵ The payment has since been increased to \$3.55, but it still far below the statutory minimum.

- 1
- 2 **a. A conflict exists and the statutory exceptions in Vehicle Code section**
- 3 **22500 do not apply because signs posted at commuter shuttle stops in**
- 4 **MUNI zones are not “official traffic control devices,” and the shuttles**
- 5 **are not stopping because it is “necessary to avoid conflict with other**
- 6 **traffic.”**

7 Vehicle Code section 22500 generally prohibits stopping in each place listed in section

8 22500, including curb space designated for bus stops. A statutory exception to this general rule

9 exists, allowing vehicles to stop at each place listed in section 22500 if done “when necessary to

10 avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the direction of a peace officer or official

11 traffic control device.”⁶ Vehicle Code § 22500. None of these exceptions apply here.

- 12 **i. The signs posted at commuter shuttle stops in MUNI zones are**
- 13 **not “official traffic control devices.”**

14 The City has argued in its demurrer that no conflict between Vehicle Code § 22500 and Sec.

15 914 exists because signs posted at shuttle stops in MUNI zones exempt the shuttles from having to

16 comply with section 22500. The City’s argument fails because not every sign or traffic control

17 device excuses a violation of 22500, only an **official traffic control device** does. The City’s signs

18 are not “official traffic control devices” under the Vehicle Code.

19 The City has placed signs on at least some MUNI stops that state, “Commuter Shuttle Pilot,

20 Permitted Users Only.” (Declaration of Carli Paine in Support of City and County of San

21 Francisco’s Demurrer to Petition for Writ of Mandate (Feb. 17, 2015)). The problem with the

22 City’s argument is that not all signs are “official traffic control devices.” The term “official traffic

23 control device” is a term of art, defined in section 440 of the Vehicle Code:

24 An “official traffic control device” is any sign, signal, marking, or device, **consistent with**

25 **Section 21400**, placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having

26 jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic, but does not include

27 islands, curbs, traffic barriers, speed humps, speed bumps, or other roadway design features.

28 Vehicle Code § 440 (emphasis added).

 The commuter shuttle signs are not “official traffic control devices because they are not

 “consistent with Section 21400.” Section 21400 of the Vehicle Code, entitled in part, “[u]niform

 standards and specifications” provides:

⁶ There is no evidence in the record that demonstrates that shuttle buses are, or have ever, stopped, parked, or idled in a MUNI zone at the direction of a peace officer.

1 (a)(1) **The Department of Transportation shall**, after consultation with local agencies and
2 **public hearings, adopt rules and regulations prescribing uniform standards and**
3 **specifications for all official traffic control devices placed pursuant to this code**,
4 including, but not limited to, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, speed restriction signs,
5 railroad warning approach signs, street name signs, lines and markings on the roadway, and
6 stock crossing signs placed pursuant to Section 21364.

7 Vehicle Code § 21400. The rules and regulations adopted by the Department of Transportation are
8 found in the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (California MUTCD), which
9 was most recently updated on November 7, 2014. (RJN Ex. C.) The California MUTCD contains
10 the uniform standards and specifications for all official traffic control devices in California. (RJN
11 Ex. C, p. 43.) According to the California MUTCD, “[t]raffic control devices should be placed and
12 operated in a uniform and consistent manner,” and “uniformity of the meaning of traffic control
13 devices is vital to their effectiveness.” (*Id.* at p. 54.)

14 None of the commuter shuttle signs are contained in the California MUTCD, and therefore
15 they are not official traffic control devices. The MUTCD contains specific signs with specific
16 language, symbols and shapes. The City’s signs are nowhere to be found in the MUTCD. There are
17 no signs in the MUTCD that state “Commuter Shuttle Pilot, Permitted Users Only,” and nowhere
18 does the MUTCD authorize the use of any sign related to commuter shuttles. (RJN Ex. C.)
19 Therefore, this sign is not an “official traffic control device” within the meaning of Vehicle Code
20 §21400.

21 Rather than addressing whether the shuttle signs are consistent with section 21400, the City
22 simply assumes that any signs posted are sufficient to allow the City to avoid compliance with the
23 Vehicle Code. This cannot be the law. Otherwise, any city could completely disregard the Vehicle
24 Code simply by putting up any sign. Instead, section 21400 allows the state DOT to authorize very
25 specific and limited signs. These do not include the signs at issue in this case. Moreover, under the
26 City’s reading, the phrase “official traffic control device” in section 22500 is meaningless, and the
27 uniformity requirements of 21400 are undermined. Since the shuttle signs are not “official traffic
28 control devices,” the shuttle buses are not excused from complying with Vehicle Code section
22500. The City’s adoption of the Shuttle Project is preempted by state law.⁷

⁷ The City’s argument that the shuttles are legally allowed to stop in MUNI zones is further undermined by the legislative history of Assembly Bill 61. AB 61 was introduced on December 12, 2014 as “[a]n act to amend Section 22500.5 of the Vehicle code, relating to shuttle services.” Assem. Bill No. 61 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.). According to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest:

1 **ii. The commuter shuttles are not stopping at MUNI zones because it**
2 **is necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic.**

3 The exemption from Section 22500 for vehicles stopping, parking, or idling in a red MUNI
4 zone “when *necessary* to avoid conflict with other traffic” is equally inapplicable. In fact, the
5 evidence in the record demonstrates that by stopping, parking, and idling in MUNI zones, the
6 shuttles are actually *creating* traffic, not *avoiding* it.

7 The Vehicle Code defines “traffic” as including “pedestrians, ridden animals, vehicles, street
8 cars, and other conveyances either singly or together, while using any highway for purposes of
9 travel.” Vehicle Code Section 620. There is no evidence that shuttle buses that stop, park, and idle
10 in bus zones are doing so because it is *necessary* to avoid conflict with other traffic. The shuttles
11 are stopping, parking, and idling at MUNI stops in order to pick up passengers.

12 Rather than avoiding traffic, the record contains abundant evidence that the shuttle buses are
13 causing and contributing to conflicts with other traffic by stopping in bus zones. Studies conducted
14 by the City’s consultant, Nelson/Nygaard Consulting Associates, Inc., and Human Impact Partners,
15 both report observations of shuttle activities contributing to localized traffic congestions (AR238-
16 240), and impeding traffic and visibility (AR1208). The SFMTA itself has “conducted field data
17 collection and confirmed that shuttle operations create conflicts with MUNI and other users of the
18 transportation system.” AR60. The field data collected by the SFMTA confirmed that shuttle
19 impacts include: “Delays to MUNI service, Forcing Muni buses to must[sic] stop in the traffic lane
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Under existing law, a person may not stop, park, or leave a vehicle standing alongside a curb space authorized for the loading or unloading of passengers of a bus engaged as a common carrier in local transportation when indicated by a sign or red paint on the curb, except that existing law allows local authorities to permit schoolbuses to stop alongside these curb spaces upon agreement between a transit system operating buses as common carriers in local transportation and a public school district or private school.

This bill would also allow local authorities to permit shuttle service vehicles, as defined, to stop for the loading or unloading of passengers alongside these curb spaces upon agreement between a transit system operating buses engaged as common carriers in local transportation and a shuttle service provider, as defined. The bill would state that it is the intent of the Legislature to not replace public transit services.

Id. AB 61 was withdrawn by the author. Therefore, the law remains in its current state, and it is unlawful for private shuttles to stop in red-curb zones. See, *CD Investment Co. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn.* (2000) 84 Cal. App.4th 1410, 1426 (enrolled bill reports may be relied upon in interpreting a statute).

1 rather than at the curb, Localized traffic congestion[, and] Diversion of bicyclists out of bike lanes
2 and into traffic lanes.” AR60. The City’s Budget and Legislative Analyst also found that shuttles
3 contribute to localized traffic congestion, and create dangerous conditions for pedestrians,
4 bicyclists, and passengers with disabilities. AR240. The record is full of additional evidence of the
5 shuttles impacts on traffic. See AR43, 126, 222-223, 238-240, 1053, 1205, 1208, 1210, 1327-1330,
6 1765, 1769, 1790, 2119, 3173, 3197.

7 Since there is no evidence that every time a shuttle pulls into a MUNI zone, it is doing so
8 because it is **necessary** to avoid conflict with traffic, the shuttle buses are not excused from
9 complying with Vehicle Code section 22500, and the City’s adoption of the Shuttle Project is
10 preempted by state law.

11 **2. The Shuttle Project is preempted because it involves a matter of statewide
12 concern.**

13 The Shuttle Project is preempted because the conflict between local and state law involves a
14 matter of statewide concern. The phrase “municipal affair” is a term of art, and a matter is not a
15 “municipal affair” unless it is of **strictly** local interest. *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. San Francisco*,
16 228 F.2d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, (1956) 351 U.S. 919. A matter is of statewide
17 concern rather than only a municipal affair when its impact is primarily regional, even if its impacts
18 are not truly statewide. *Comm. of Seven Thousand*, 45 Cal.3d at 505.

19 Transportation, particularly transportation that crosses county lines, is a quintessential
20 matter of statewide concern. Public Utilities Code § 99220(b) states, “[t]he fostering, continuance,
21 and development of public transportation systems are a matter of state concern.” Inter-city transit is
22 precisely the subject matter of the Shuttle Project and is therefore a matter of statewide concern.
23 Unless expressly provided by the legislature, a city has no authority over vehicular traffic control.
24 *Rumford v. City of Berkeley* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 545, 550 (city may not place traffic barriers on local
25 streets because they could interfere with inter-city traffic which is a matter of statewide concern).
26 As the Supreme Court stated in *Rumford*, “A city’s police powers do not extend to control of
27 vehicular traffic on its streets; that field has been preempted (Vehicle Code sec. 21).” *Id.* at 553.

28 The California Supreme Court has held that cities (including charter cities) may not enact
ordinances that conflict with the State Vehicle Code, because the Vehicle Code expressly preempts
local regulation. *O’Connell v. City of Stockton* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061, 1074. The Supreme Court
noted that Vehicle Code § 21 provides:

1 Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are applicable and
2 uniform throughout the State and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local
3 authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless
expressly authorized herein.

4 The court held that a city ordinance requiring forfeiture of cars used in prostitution was preempted
5 by the State Vehicle code: “the City’s ordinance is expressly preempted by state law.” *Id.* at 1074.
6 Since the Shuttle Program allows private buses to park in red-curb zones reserved by the State
Vehicle Code for only public buses, the Program is expressly preempted by state law.

7 Vehicle Code § 22500(i) deals with matters of statewide concern. Public transportation is
8 not strictly a municipal affair, but rather is a matter of statewide concern. Section 22500(i) was
9 designed to allow public transportation to move efficiently throughout the state, by ensuring that
10 vehicles other than “common carriers” do not block bus stops and cause delays to public
11 transportation systems. The bus stops in San Francisco serve regional public transit agencies,
12 including SamTrans,⁸ Golden Gate Transit,⁹ CalTrain, and AC Transit.¹⁰ AR232. By allowing
13 private commuter shuttles to use public bus stops, the regional public transportation system is
14 affected. Its effects are not purely local. The Shuttle Project impacts persons outside of San
Francisco, and therefore is a matter to which the state is empowered to, and has, regulated.

15 The Public Utilities Code provides:

16 Public transportation is an essential component of the balanced transportation system which
17 must be maintained and developed so as to permit the efficient and orderly movement of
18 people and goods in the urban areas of the state. Because public transportation systems
19 provide an essential public service, it is desirable that such systems be designed and
operated in such a manner as to encourage maximum utilization of the efficiencies of the
service for the benefit of ***the total transportation system of the state and all the people of
the state***, including the elderly, disabled, the youth, and the citizens of limited means.

20 Pub. Util. Code § 99220(a) (emphasis added).

21 By allowing private commuter shuttles to use public bus stops, the Shuttle Project impacts
22 public transportation. Since Vehicle Code § 22500(i) deals with matters of statewide concern, and
23 the Shuttle Project conflicts with it, the Shuttle Project is preempted and San Francisco
Transportation Code Sec. 914 is null and void.

24
25
26 ⁸ SamTrans provides bus service in between San Francisco and San Mateo County.

27 ⁹ Golden Gate Transit buses run from San Francisco to Marin and Sonoma Counties.

28 ¹⁰ AC Transit operates bus service between San Francisco and the East Bay.

1 **B. The City abused its discretion and violated CEQA by exempting the Shuttle Project**
2 **from CEQA review despite substantial evidence in the record of significant**
3 **environmental impacts.**

4 **1. Legal Background**

5 CEQA mandates that “the long-term protection of the environment . . . shall be the guiding
6 criterion in public decisions” throughout California. PRC § 21001(d). The foremost principle
7 under CEQA is that it is to be “interpreted in such a manner as to afford the fullest possible
8 protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.” *Citizens of*
9 *Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Sups.* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 563-64. An agency’s action violates CEQA if it
10 “thwarts the statutory goals” of “informed decisionmaking” and “informed public participation.”
11 *Kings Co. Farm Bur. v. City of Hanford* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, 712.

12 To achieve its objectives of environmental protection, CEQA has a three-tiered structure. 14
13 CCR § 15002(k); *Comm. to Save Hollywoodland v. City of Los Angeles* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th
14 1168, 1185-86. First, if a project falls into an exempt category, no further agency evaluation is
15 required. *Id.* Second, if there is a possibility the project will have a significant effect on the
16 environment, the agency must perform a threshold initial study. *Id.*; 14 CCR § 15063(a). If the
17 study indicates that there is no substantial evidence that the project may cause a significant effect on
18 the environment the agency may issue a negative declaration. *Id.*, 14 CCR §§ 15063(b)(2), 15070.
19 Finally, if the project will have a significant effect on the environment, an environmental impact
20 report (“EIR”) is required. *Id.* Here, since the City exempted the Project from CEQA, we are at the
21 first step of the CEQA process, where the standard is extremely low.

22 **a. Categorical exemptions**

23 CEQA identifies certain classes of projects that are exempt from the provisions of CEQA.
24 These are called categorical exemptions. PRC § 21084(a); 14 CCR §§ 15300, 15354. Categorical
25 exemptions are certain classes of activities that generally do not have a significant effect on the
26 environment. *Id.* Public agencies utilizing such exemptions must support their determination with
27 substantial evidence. PRC § 21168.5. CEQA exemptions are narrowly construed and “[e]xemption
28 categories are not to be expanded beyond the reasonable scope of their statutory language.”
Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 125; *McQueen v. Bd. of*
Dirs. (1988) 202 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1148. Erroneous reliance by an agency on a categorical
exemption constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion and a violation of CEQA. *Azusa*, 52 Cal.
App. 4th at 1192. “[I]f the court perceives there was substantial evidence that the project might

1 have an adverse impact, but the agency failed to secure preparation of an EIR, the agency’s action
2 must be set aside because the agency abused its discretion by failing to follow the law.” *Dunn-*
3 *Edwards*, 9 Cal. App. 4th at 656.

4 The City exempted the Project from CEQA review by relying on the Class 6 categorical
5 exemption for “Information Collection” (“Class 6 Exemption” or “Information Collection
6 Exemption”). This narrow exemption states that:

7 Class 6 consists of basic data collection, research, experimental management and resource
8 evaluation activities which do not result in a serious or major disturbance to an
9 environmental resource. These may be strictly for information gathering purposes, or as part
10 of a study leading to an action which a public agency has not yet approved, adopted, or
11 funded.

12 14 CCR §15306. Failure to comply with the terms of the exemption renders the exemption
13 inapplicable. The question of “whether the Commission’s activity fell within the express terms of a
14 categorical exemption,” is a question of law subject to independent, or *de novo* review. *Berkeley*
15 *Hillside*, 60 Cal. 4th at 1109; *San Lorenzo Valley Comty. Advocates v. San Lorenzo Valley Unif.*
16 *Sch. Dist.* (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1375 (“[Q]uestions of interpretation or application of the
17 requirements of CEQA are matters of law. [Citations.] Thus, for example, interpreting the scope of
18 a CEQA exemption presents ‘a question of law, subject to *de novo* review by this court.’”)

19 **b. Exceptions to categorical exemptions**

20 CEQA contains several exceptions to categorical exemptions. 14 CCR § 15300.2. If an
21 exception applies, the exemption cannot be used, and the agency must instead prepare an initial
22 study and CEQA document. *McQueen*, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1149; *Hollywoodland*, 161 Cal. App.
23 4th at 1187. “Even if a project falls within the description of one of the exempt classes, it may
24 nonetheless have a significant effect on the environment based on factors such as location,
25 cumulative impact, or unusual circumstances.” *Save Our Carmel River v. Monterey Peninsula*
26 *Water Mgmt. Dist.* (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 677, 689. The “significant effects” exception provides
27 that a categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility
28 that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to “unusual circumstances.”
14 CCR §15300.2(c).

“The determination as to whether there are ‘unusual circumstances’ ... is reviewed under
section 21168.5’s substantial evidence prong. However, an agency’s finding as to whether unusual
circumstances give rise to ‘a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on

1 the environment’ ... is reviewed to determine whether the agency, in applying the fair argument
2 standard, ‘proceeded in [the] manner required by law.’” *Berkeley Hillside*, 60 Cal. 4th at 1114.

3 The Court’s review of the exceptions to the categorical exemptions is also governed by the
4 fair argument standard. “[A]n agency must apply a fair argument approach in determining whether,
5 under Guidelines section 15300.2(c), there is no reasonable possibility of a significant effect on the
6 environment due to unusual circumstances.” *Banker’s Hill, Hillcrest, Park West Cmty.*
7 *Preservation Group v. City of San Diego* (2006) 139 Cal. App. 4th 249, 264; *Dunn-Edwards*, 9 Cal.
8 App. 4th at 654-655. Accordingly, a reviewing court must “independently review the agency’s
9 determination under Guidelines section 15300.2(c) to determine whether the record contains
10 evidence of a fair argument of a significant effect on the environment.” *Id.*

11 Under the fair argument standard, if an agency is presented with a fair argument, supported
12 by substantial evidence, that the project may have a significant effect on the environment, it cannot
13 use a categorical exemption even where it is presented with other substantial evidence¹¹ indicating
14 that the project will have no significant effect. *Azusa*, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1201-2. The fair
15 argument standard creates a “low threshold” for further environmental review and “reflects a
16 preference for resolving doubts in favor of environmental review when the question is whether any
17 such review is warranted.” *Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma* (1992) 6 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1316-
18 1317. Under this standard, the court does not weigh evidence, but only determines whether there is
19 any substantial evidence of a possibility of environmental harm. *Dunn-Edwards*, 9 Cal. App. 4th at
20 647. Likewise, “deference to the agency’s determination is not appropriate.” *Stanislaus Audubon*
21 *Society, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus* (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 144, 151.

22 **2. The Class 6 “Information Collection” Categorical Exemption Does not Apply to**
23 **the Shuttle Project as a Matter of Law.**

24 The Court’s initial determination as to whether the exemption applies on its face is a
25 question of law subject to independent, or *de novo*, review. *San Lorenzo Valley*, 139 Cal. App. 4th
26 at 1375. The City’s attempt to avoid CEQA review by exempting the Project as a Class 6
27 Information Collection activity is improper. Class 6 is a very limited exemption for information
28 collection. It is limited to “basic data collection, research, experimental management, and resource

11 “Substantial evidence” under this standard means “enough relevant information and reasonable
inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even
though other conclusions might also be reached. . . .” (14 CCR § 15384(a).)

1 evaluation activities which do not result in a serious or major disturbance to an environmental
2 resource.” 14 CCR § 15306. Categorical exemptions, such as the Class 6 exemption, are narrowly
3 construed, and are limited to their terms. *Castaic Lake Water Agency v. City of Santa Clarita*
4 (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 1257, 1268. “Since a determination that a project falls within a categorical
5 exemption excuses any further compliance with CEQA whatsoever, we must construe the
6 exemptions narrowly in order to afford the fullest possible environmental protection.” *Save Our*
7 *Carmel River v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist.* (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 677, 697.
8 The Shuttle Project does not fit within the terms of the Class 6 Information Collection exemption
9 because it goes far beyond basic “information collection,” and because the Project will result in a
10 “serious or major disturbance to an environmental resource.”

11 The City contends that the Project is exempt from CEQA review because the SFMTA will
12 collect data about the Project during the 18-month pilot period. The City is attempting to make the
13 Class 6 exemption applicable for anything it deems a “pilot project.” AR3238 (City Environmental
14 Review Officer referred to the Class 6 exemption as the “pilot exemption”). According to the City,
15 the fact that data will be collected as part of the Project, makes the Project exempt from CEQA
16 review as a Class 6 “information collection activity.” AR3224. The City’s Environmental Review
17 Officer testified that the decision to find the Project exempt was based on the following: “the
18 proposed pilot program will include data collection, experimental management, and study that will
19 help formulate a long term regulatory program. So that fits under class six.” AR3224.

20 The City’s argument proves too much. Under the City’s reasoning, any activity that also
21 includes data collection would be subject to the Class 6 exemption, regardless of the nature of the
22 underlying activities. Under the City’s argument, an oil refinery could be built and operated, and as
23 long as data was collected about refinery emissions during a “pilot period,” the refinery project
24 would be exempt from CEQA review. This is clearly contrary to CEQA. *See, Castaic Lake*, 41
25 Cal. App. 4th at 1268 (CEQA earthquake exemption did not apply to rebuilding of City center
26 because rebuilding project included elements beyond mere earthquake repairs and reconstruction).

27 The mere fact that data is also being collected does not mean that the Project is an
28 information collection activity. Regardless of the City’s desire to test policy options, the Class 6
exemption is not a “pilot project” exemption. It is for a much more narrow set of activities. This
exemption is for gathering data – it is not for launching a transportation system that rivals the size

1 of CalTrain. The Class 6 exemption is inapplicable to the Shuttle Project because, like the refinery
2 example, the Project goes far beyond the scope of mere information collection.

3 Indeed the City’s own descriptions of the Project demonstrate that data collection is only a
4 small portion of the Project; it is not the Project itself. The City describes the Project as a “permit
5 program to allow shuttle service providers to use designated MUNI stops for passenger loading and
6 unloading, and establishing permit conditions and a permit fee.” AR59. The Shuttle Project allows
7 more than 350 buses to engage in more than 35,000 boardings per day, and includes: (1) the
8 development of a network of 200 shared Muni and shuttle stops, (2) a permit application and fee
9 program, (3) adoption and implementation of shuttle operating guidelines, (4) parking control
10 officers to enforce the permits, and (5) data provided from the shuttle operators to the SFMTA. AR
11 130. There is no reasonable interpretation of the Shuttle Project as mere “information collection.”

12 The City’s own CEQA guidance document undermines the City’s litigation position. The
13 City’s CEQA guidance document provides that the Class 6 exemption, “is for the most part non-
14 physical, but it also includes such activities as test borings; soil, water, and vegetation sampling;
15 and materials testing in facilities and structures.” RJN Ex. A, p. 13. The City’s longstanding
16 interpretation of the Class 6 exemption embodied in its published guidance is entitled to deference.
17 *Fujitsu IT Holdings v. Franchise Tax Bd.* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 459, 462. When, as here, the
18 agency takes a litigation position that is inconsistent with its published guidance document or a
19 regulation, the litigation position is entitled to no deference. See, *Environmental Law Foundation v.*
20 *Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp.* (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 307, 329; *POET, LLC v. State Air Resources*
21 *Bd.* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, 748. In each example listed in the City’s guidance document, the
22 project itself is the information collection activity. For example, the exempt project is the sampling
23 of water, or the drilling of a test well. If the City were merely taking air samples near the shuttle
24 stops or were placing GPS devices on shuttles, those may constitute information collection activities
25 – but not the authorization of a private transit system with 35,000 boardings each day.

26 This Project is not just about collecting data. The Project allows an unlimited number of
27 shuttle buses to pick people up at stops, transport them to work, and then take them back and drop
28 them off at 200 stops around San Francisco. The Shuttle Project creates and legalizes a private
shuttle transportation system “whose ridership is equivalent to that of a small transit system.” AR2.

1 Rather than the data collection being the project itself, data is being collected to “measure the
2 effectiveness of managing and regulating commuter shuttle loading activities.”¹² AR127.

3 Furthermore, the Class 6 exemption does not apply if the activity will “result in a serious or
4 major disturbance to an environmental resource.” 14 CCR §15306. As discussed below, expert
5 analysis demonstrates that the commuter Shuttle Project has significant impacts on air quality,
6 pedestrian and bicycle safety, public transportation, traffic, and displacement. In contrast, the city
7 has provided no evidence to support the Notice of Exemption’s (“NOE”) bare conclusion that the
8 Shuttle Project would not result in a disturbance to an environmental resource. As such, the Class 6
9 exemption does not apply by its own terms. The City’s certification of the NOE “is an attempt to
10 use limited exemptions contained in CEQA as a means to subvert rules regulating the protection of
11 the environment.” *Castaic Lake*, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1257, 1268.

11 **3. The Shuttle Project cannot be exempt from CEQA because it will have
12 significant environmental impacts due to unusual circumstances.**

12 Even assuming *arguendo* that the Project constitutes an information collection activity as
13 defined by CEQA, the City still abused its discretion by issuing a notice of exemption because the
14 Project falls under the “significant effect” exception to categorical exemptions. 14 CCR §
15 15300.2(c). A categorical exemption is inapplicable “where there is a reasonable possibility that the
16 activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances.” *Id.*

16 **a. Unusual Circumstances Exist Precluding the Exemption.**

17 What is “unusual” is “judged relative to the *typical* circumstances related to an otherwise
18 typical exempt project.” *Santa Monica Chamber of Commerce v. City of Santa Monica* (2002) 101
19 Cal. App. 4th 786, 801 (emphasis added). An unusual circumstance is “some feature of the project
20 that distinguishes it from others in the exempt class.” *San Lorenzo Valley*, 139 Cal. App. 4th at
21 1381. The *Azusa* Court held that the unusual circumstances test would be satisfied where the

22 ¹² The administrative record contains dozens of examples of “data collection” being discussed as a
23 means of analyzing the effectiveness of the Project, not as the Project itself. For example, in
24 describing the benefits of the Project, the city provides that “[t]he Pilot program will allow the
25 SFMTA to build on knowledge that exists and test out an approach and gather additional data about
26 the performance of this approach that can inform longer term solutions.” AR 129 [emphasis
27 added]; *see also* AR 133 (“The Pilot program has been carefully designed to test a solution to the
28 issues raised by the expanded use of commuter shuttles in San Francisco, and provide SFMT A with
data to accurately assess the Pilot”); AR1067 (“The SFMTA proposes to collect data during the
course of the pilot program that will directly support the implementation of the pilot”).

1 circumstances of a particular project: (i) differ from the general circumstances of the projects
2 covered by a particular categorical exemption, and (ii) those circumstances create an environmental
3 risk that does not exist for the general class of exempt projects. *Azusa*, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1207;
4 *Hollywoodland*, 161 Cal. App. 4th at 1187 (construction of new fence atop historic granite wall
5 posed environmental risk that did not exist for “general class of exempt projects” under the Class 5
6 exemption due to differing historic nature of wall); *Fairbank v. City of Mill Valley* (1999) 75 Cal.
7 App. 4th 1243, 1260-1261 (court looked for “some feature of the project that distinguishes it from
any other small, run-of-the-mill commercial building or use” covered by claimed exemption).

8 Even if the Shuttle Project fell within the Class 6 Exemption (which it does not), it is
9 certainly “unusual,” since it is not a “typical,” *Santa Monica Chamber of Commerce*, 101
10 Cal.App.4th at 801, or “run of the mill,” *Fairbank*, 75 Cal.App.4th at 1261, information collection
11 exercise. Perhaps the most notable “unusual circumstance” is the fact that the Shuttle Project
12 violates state law by allowing private buses to stop in red-curb zones reserved for public transit
13 vehicles. As a result of that violation of law, as discussed below, the Project creates significant
14 impacts on public transit, traffic congestion, pedestrian safety and bicycle lanes. The *Azusa* court
15 held that the fact that a project violated state law was an unusual circumstance. *Azusa*, 52 Cal. App.
4th at 1208-09 (violation of state water code was unusual circumstance).

16 Another unusual circumstance is that the Shuttle Project involves stops in close proximity to
17 residences – involving stops as close as five feet from residences. AR1384. As a result of the close
18 proximity, as discussed below, the Shuttles create a significant cancer risk (AR1386), and noise
19 impacts on nearby residents (AR1423). In *Lewis v. 17th Dist. Ag. Ass’n* (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d
20 823, 829, the court held that proximity of residences to a proposed stock car race track was an
21 “unusual circumstance” since it resulted in noise and air pollution impacts not typical for the
22 category of projects subject to the exemption. Similarly, in the instant case, typical information
23 collection projects do not involve exposing thousands of nearby residents to air pollution and noise
24 above CEQA significance thresholds. *See also Bloom v. McGurk* (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th
25 1307, 1316 (“no homes in the immediate vicinity” of the incinerator); *Meridian Ocean Sys. v. State
Lands Comm’n* (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 153, 164-165 (reasonable possibility of adverse noise
effects on marine life from geophysical testing was unusual circumstances precluding exemption).

26 CEQA lists as examples of the types of projects to which the Class 6 exemption would
27 apply, “basic data collection, research, experimental management, and resources evaluation
28

1 activities which do not result in a serious or major disturbance to an environmental resource.” 14
2 CCR § 15306. Similarly, the City’s CEQA guidance documents lists, as examples of the types of
3 projects to which the information collection exemption would apply, “mostly non-physical
4 activities, test borings, soil sampling, water sampling, vegetation sample, and materials testing in
5 facilities and structures.” RJN, Exh. A, p. 13. An example of a typical Class 6 activity is the
6 Olivenhain Municipal Water District’s San Elijo Valley Groundwater Project, which was a research
7 project that used a single pilot well to determine the quantity and quality of a deep water aquifer
8 beneath a lagoon and to obtain a better understanding of the geology around the lagoon. AR1433.
9 Also found to be exempt as a Class 6 activity, the Update to the San Diego Bay Integrated Natural
10 Resources Management Plan involved the review, evaluation, and determination of accuracy of
11 existing data regarding natural resources of the San Diego Bay. AR1428.

12 The Shuttle Project presents an unusual circumstance because, unlike the mostly non-
13 physical, basic data collection, experimental management and resource evaluations exempt under
14 Class 6, the Shuttle Project involves the physical movement of more than 17,000 people on 350
15 buses every day. Typical information collection activities are dwarfed in scale compared to the size
16 of the Shuttle Project. Data collection activities do not usually involve the operation of a transit
17 system similar in size to a medium-sized transit agency. AR2205. Additionally, the public safety
18 risks posed by the Shuttle Project is an unusual circumstance precluding CEQA exemption. Most
19 information collection activities do not cause public safety risks, including cancer risks and risks of
20 injury to pedestrians and bicyclists.

21 The unusual circumstances resulting from the massive scale and impact of the Shuttle
22 Project, combined with substantial evidence in the record of significant environmental impacts,
23 precludes the use of an exemption for the Shuttle Project.

24 **b. There is a Fair Argument that the Shuttle Project May Have Significant
25 Adverse Impacts Due to Unusual Circumstances.**

26 When considering a CEQA exemption, an impact is considered significant if there is a “fair
27 argument” demonstrating a “reasonable possibility” that the project may have a significant
28 environmental impact. *Berkeley Hillside*, 60 Cal.4th at 1114; *Dunn-Edwards*, 9 Cal.App.4th at 656.
Under the fair argument standard, an effect is considered significant even if there is contrary
evidence, so long as there is some substantial evidence in the record indicating a significant impact.
Azusa, 41 Cal.App.4th at 1202. Substantial evidence, for purposes of the fair argument standard,
includes “fact, a reasonable assumption based upon fact, or expert opinion supported by fact.” PRC

1 § 21080(e)(1.) As discussed below, expert opinion supports a fair argument that the Project may
2 have significant impacts on human health, traffic, public transportation, and displacement of low-
3 income residents.

4 **i. Increased cancer risk from diesel emissions.**

5 The Shuttle Project will result in significant cancer impacts, above CEQA significance
6 thresholds, as a result of the Project’s diesel emissions. AR1380-1390; *see also Bakersfield Citizens*
7 *for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th at 1219-20 (CEQA document must
8 analyze “health consequences that necessarily result from the identified adverse air quality
9 impacts.”); PRC § 21083(b)(3). Environmental Chemist, Dr. Paul Rosenfeld, Ph.D.¹³ submitted a
10 detailed modeling analysis proving that the diesel engine exhaust from the shuttles will increase
11 cancer risks to people living near shuttle stops above the Bay Area Air Quality Management
12 District’s (“BAAQMD”) CEQA threshold of significance. AR1380-1390. According to Dr.
13 Rosenfeld, San Francisco residents near shuttle stops would experience an increased cancer risk of
14 approximately 12 per million as a direct result of the Shuttle Project. AR1385. This exceeds the
15 BAAQMD CEQA significance threshold¹⁴ for airborne cancer risk of 10 per million. AR1571-2.
16 When an air quality impact exceeds CEQA thresholds adopted by the local air district, it must be
17 disclosed as significant in a CEQA document. *Schenck v. County of Sonoma* (2011) 198
18 Cal.App.4th 949, 960; *Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality*
19 *Management Dist.* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, 327.

20 Certified traffic engineer Tom Brohard, PE, concluded that, by legalizing private shuttle
21 stops in red-zones (an activity that is currently illegal), the Shuttle Project is likely to increase idle
22 times, which would in turn produce greater emissions of diesel exhaust.¹⁵ AR1651.

23 The City provided no evidence at all to rebut this expert testimony. Thus, even under the
24 substantial evidence standard, the only substantial evidence in the record indicates that the Shuttle
25 Program will have significant cancer impacts, above the CEQA significance threshold.
26

27 ¹³ As a matter of law, expert opinion constitutes substantial evidence establishing a fair argument of
28 significant environmental impacts. *Azusa*, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1195.

¹⁴CEQA encourages agencies to adopt quantitative thresholds for significance, and impacts which
exceed those threshold “will normally be determined to be significant.” 14 CCR § 15064.7.

¹⁵ According to certified traffic engineer Tom Brohard, PE without the Shuttle Project, shuttle
operators often attempted to clear MUNI red zones quickly to avoid substantial tickets. Since the
Shuttle Project purports to make it legal for private shuttles to block public bus stops, the shuttles
are likely to stop and idle at the bus stops for longer periods of time. AR1651.

1 If the City conducted CEQA review, it would be required to analyze these impacts and
2 implement all feasible mitigation measures. Feasible mitigation measures could include such
3 measures as requiring shuttle buses to use clean-fuel such as biodiesel or natural gas, or hybrid
4 electric power, as used by MUNI. AR1376, 1542. Since the City avoided CEQA, it considered no
5 such mitigations.

6 **ii. Impacts on pedestrian and bicycle safety.**

7 In addition to increased cancer risks, the record contains substantial evidence of impacts on
8 pedestrian and bicyclist safety. AR1415-1421. Expert evidence by Human Impact Partners
9 (“HIP”), a non-profit public policy research organization, concludes that the Shuttle Project will
10 contribute cumulatively to pedestrian and bicyclist safety risk in San Francisco. AR1415.
11 According to HIP, “The presence and intensity of transit service is an established spatial risk factor
12 for pedestrian injuries.” AR1417. According to the City’s own Budget and Legislative Analyst, the
13 Project may have potential negative environmental impacts on bicyclist and pedestrian safety.¹⁶
14 AR240, 253. For example, an expert consultant retained by the City reported that at a MUNI stop at
15 Fourth and Townsend, during an evening shuttle observation, 23% of all shuttle observations
16 blocked the bicycle lane leading up to the intersection. AR1769-70. A January 2014 report from
17 the SFMTA found that commuter shuttles result in diversion of bicyclists out of bike lanes and into
18 traffic lanes. AR2822. The San Francisco County Transportation Authority published a study
19 concluding that the private shuttles cause frequent conflicts with cars, MUNI and bicycles. AR1540.
20 The record also contains substantial evidence by citizens, including San Francisco Supervisor John
21 Avalos,¹⁷ who have observed these impacts directly. AR3172-3; 3197-8, 3202-3. The City
22 provided no evidence to rebut this expert testimony. Thus, the only substantial evidence in the
23 record indicates that the Shuttle Project will have significant impacts on pedestrian safety.

24 ¹⁶ The BLA even makes suggestions – which were not included in the Project – for addressing these
25 negative impacts, including establishing shuttle size limitations and requiring certain safety features
26 on shuttles, and requiring a cap on the number of shuttles. AR253.

27 ¹⁷ Supervisor Avalos explained his observations at the April 1, 2014 Board of Supervisors meeting:
28 “[W]hen I actually ride my bike on Valencia Street or if I am with my kids on 24th Street in Noe
Valley where they have music lessons and I see a shuttle bus go by, if I am on my bike I have to go
swerve way out of the way and get deeply into traffic, that worries me. Am I going to get hit and
get blind-sided on the side down on 24th Street? I am seeing that same issue happening where cars
are actually backed up for blocks trying to get around a bus that’s there, and also people edging
around buses that are blocking their pathway, make it very, very dangerous.” AR3173.

1 The City’s “Transportation Impact Significance Criteria” provides that a project will have a
2 significant effect on the environment “if it would create potentially hazardous conditions for
3 bicyclists or otherwise substantially interfere with bicycle accessibility to the site and adjoining
4 areas.” RJN, Exh. B, p. 2. Similarly, a project will “have a significant effect on the environment if
5 it would . . . create potentially hazardous conditions for pedestrians, or otherwise interfere with
6 pedestrian accessibility to the site and adjoining areas.” *Id.* A City must apply its own published
7 CEQA significance thresholds. *Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orange* (2005) 131
8 Cal.App.4th 777, 796. The courts have held that lay testimony is sufficient to create a fair argument
9 of traffic impacts, as here. *Mejia v. City of Los Angeles* (2005) 130 Cal. App. 4th 322, 341. There is
10 expert and lay evidence sufficient to create a fair argument that the Shuttle Project may have
11 significant impacts under the City’s significance criteria.

12 If the City had conducted CEQA review, it would be legally required to implement all
13 feasible mitigation measures and alternatives to reduce these impacts.

14 **iii. Significant noise impacts.**

15 HIP conducted an analysis of the noise impacts from the Shuttle Project and concluded that
16 the Shuttle Project will have noise impacts well above the applicable significance thresholds.
17 AR1423-1426. HIP’s analysis concluded that “private employer shuttle bus operations contribute
18 cumulatively to noise exposure and adverse health impacts among San Francisco residents living
19 near bus stops and along major transit routes.” AR1423. Importantly, the Shuttle Project “will
20 concentrate these noise impacts in proximity to a limited number of MUNI Stops, including within
21 traffic corridors with existing health adverse exposures to traffic noise.” AR1423. “Because
22 private shuttle buses are operating on existing transit routes, shuttle noise emissions will contribute
23 cumulatively to noise emissions in areas where existing noise levels are already well above levels
24 protective to public health.” AR1426. According to HIP, “Chronic exposure to road traffic has
25 several well-established impacts on health, including noise annoyance, decreased cognitive
26 functioning and school performance among children, sleep impairment, and excessive alertness.”
27 AR 1423. The San Francisco Transportation Authority study also indicated serious noise concerns
28 among residents. AR1539. Noise impacts are significant environmental impacts under CEQA.
Lewis, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 829; *Oro Fino Gold Mining Corp. v. County of El Dorado* (1990) 225
Cal. App. 3d 872, 882. The City provided no evidence to rebut this expert testimony. Thus, the

1 only substantial evidence in the record indicates that the Shuttle Project will have significant
2 adverse noise impacts. CEQA review would require the City to analyze and mitigate these impacts.

3 **iv. Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates that the Shuttle Project**
4 **will have a significant impact on traffic and public transportation.**

5 The City further abused its discretion by ignoring substantial evidence in the record
6 demonstrating that the Shuttle Project will have significant impacts on traffic and on the operation
7 of MUNI. AR1540. The City’s CEQA guidance document provides: “A project would have a
8 significant effect on the environment if it would result in a loading demand during the peak hour of
9 loading activities that could not be accommodated within proposed on-site loading facilities or
10 within convenient on-street loading zones, and created potentially hazardous conditions or
11 significant delays affecting traffic, transit, bicycles or pedestrians.” RJN, Exh. B, p. 2. Expert
12 evidence in the record demonstrates that the Shuttle Project may exceed this threshold of
13 significance. When an impact exceeds a threshold of significance, it must be deemed significant
14 and analyzed in a CEQA document. *Cmtys. for a Better Env’t. v. Cal. Res. Agency* (2002) 103 Cal.
15 App. 4th 98, 111 (“A ‘threshold of significance’ for a given environmental effect is simply that
16 level at which the lead agency finds the effects of the project to be significant”).

17 A January 2014 report from the SFMTA found that commuter shuttles result in delays to
18 MUNI, cause MUNI buses to stop in the traffic lanes rather than at the curb, cause localized traffic
19 congestion, and divert bicyclists out of bike lanes and into traffic lanes. AR2822. The San
20 Francisco Transportation Authority report concluded:

21 “The large majority (approximately 90%) of shuttle stops occur at Muni bus zones; some
22 stops and layovers also occur at non-Muni stop red-curb zones. SFMTA planning staff
23 report this has been a general problem at several locations. This concern was echoed by both
24 SFMTA field supervision staff and in resident outreach surveys and meetings. SFMTA staff
25 noted that shuttle dwell times can be lengthy, even compared with Muni dwell times, due to
26 the large size of motor coaches, their high floor configuration, and use of a single door for
27 boarding and alighting.” AR1540.

28 The City’s documents show that at peak locations, shuttles outnumbered MUNI operations
1.5 to 1, AR3033, and that shuttles frequently block the travel lane, up to six times per hour.
AR3033. Impacts to MUNI noted by the City’s consultant following field data collection include
delays to MUNI service, forcing MUNI buses to stop in traffic lanes rather than at the curb,
localized traffic congestion, and diversion of bicyclists out of bike lanes and into traffic lanes.
AR60, 2213. Indeed, even the SFMTA admits that “there are effects that these shuttles are having
that are not supportive of our policy goals, such as delays they might be creating on MUNI, just to

1 name one significant one for us.” AR3268. The Budget and Legislative Analyst concluded that the
2 private shuttles have significant adverse impacts on traffic and MUNI operations. AR1688-90.
3 Many members of the public testified that the private shuttles are causing significant delays in
4 MUNI service. AR3172-3, 3197-8, 3202-3. This substantial evidence creates a “fair argument”
5 that the Shuttle Project may have significant adverse impacts to transit service.

6 **v. Substantial evidence in the record demonstrates that the Shuttle Project**
7 **may result in displacement of large numbers of people.**

8 A project has significant impacts requiring CEQA review if it will “displace substantial
9 numbers of people, necessitating the construction of replacement housing.” CEQA Guidelines
10 Appendix G, Section XII. The Shuttle Project is likely to displace numerous residents and
11 commuters who currently live, work, commute, and recreate in the areas near shuttle stops, and
12 replace them with workers from private companies sponsoring the shuttles, who are wealthier and
13 less likely to come from communities of color. These displacement impacts must be studied and
14 mitigated in an EIR.

15 The record includes several studies documenting the displacement impacts of the Shuttle
16 Project. A study by Alexandra Goldman, MCP, of University of California Berkeley, found that
17 rents rise much faster near private shuttle stops than elsewhere in the City. AR1408-1413, 1467.
18 Goldman’s “report suggests that the Google Shuttles are driving up rental prices within a walking
19 distance (half mile) of five of the shuttle stops.” AR1443. Goldman concludes, “rental prices are
20 rising, and landlords, seeking to capitalize on the boom, are evicting larger numbers of their lower-
21 income tenants.” AR1457.

22 A study by Dai and Weinzimmer of University of California Berkeley planning department
23 similarly concludes that the private shuttles have exacerbated San Francisco’s “jobs-housing
24 imbalance,” has pushed housing prices up in San Francisco, and have contributed to displacement
25 of low-income communities. AR1499-1514. The study found that almost one-half of shuttle
26 commuters would live closer to their suburban workplaces if the shuttles were discontinued.
27 AR1512. Thus, the shuttles increase pressure on the limited housing stock in the City. *See*
28 AR1553-64.

The Budget and Legislative Analyst’s report agrees that the commuter shuttles appear to be
contributing to displacement impacts. The shuttles are bringing higher income people into the city,
displacing lower and moderate income people. The BLA report recognizes that the shuttle buses
are one factor that is contributing to gentrification and displacement in the City of San Francisco.

1 AR1693-1697. The BLA report concludes that the commuter shuttle buses are having an impact on
2 displacement and causing rents to rise. AR1697.

3 These published research studies constitute substantial evidence that the Shuttle Project may
4 have significant adverse environmental impacts.

5 **4. The City relied on an improper baseline, unsupported by substantial evidence,
6 in determining that the Shuttle Project will have no environmental impacts.**

7 The City argued that no CEQA review is required because the “baseline” is the existing
8 environment, which includes the illegal shuttle operations. The City contends that the Shuttle
9 Project merely continues the existing illegal operations, and so there is no change from the existing
10 environment, and therefore no CEQA review is required. AR159. The City is mistaken because the
11 Shuttle Project will change the existing environment.

12 Every CEQA document must start from a “baseline” assumption. The CEQA “baseline” is
13 the set of environmental conditions against which to compare a project’s anticipated impacts.
14 *Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. So Coast Air Qual. Mgmt. Dist.* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, 321. The
15 baseline is “...the physical environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they exist at
16 the time [environmental analysis] is commenced . . . This environmental setting will normally
17 constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a Lead Agency determines whether an impact
18 is significant.” 14 CCR §15125(a). If the proposed project does not change the baseline conditions,
19 then there is no impact to analyze under CEQA. *Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. County of
20 Monterey* (2001) 87 Cal. App. 4th 99, 124-125.

21 First, the Shuttle Project will change the existing environment. The City admits that the
22 Shuttle Project will involve relocating shuttle stops to new locations. AR129-130, 138, 144.
23 SFMTA Director Ed Reiskin testified that many of the 200 shuttle stops would be relocated under
24 the Project. AR3227. These locations may or may not be the same as existing stops. Therefore, the
25 Shuttle Project is not merely a continuation of existing conditions. Of course, an agency must
26 analyze a project that involves a change to the existing environment. *Ventura Foothill Neighbors v.
27 County of Ventura* (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 429, 436 (increase in height of building from 75 to 90
28 feet required CEQA review).

Second, the City will be changing the legal status of the pirate shuttles. The City is
amending the Transportation Code to authorize the private buses to use public bus stops. By
amending the City Transportation Code to render this illegal activity authorized under local
ordinance, the City is taking action to change the status quo.

1 Traffic engineer Tom Brohard, PE, has concluded that by authorizing currently illegal
2 activity, the Shuttle Project will increase the number of shuttles operating in the City, thereby
3 resulting in significant impacts. AR1736-1738. He concludes that even though some companies are
4 currently operating illegal “pirate shuttles,” there are many companies that are unwilling to violate
5 the law or risk penalties. The Shuttle Project will authorize activity that was previously illegal. It is
6 almost certain that additional companies will enter the shuttle market once it is legal. AR1737.

7 Traffic Engineer Brohard also concludes that the Shuttle Project is likely to increase idle
8 times. Currently, shuttle operators often attempt to clear MUNI red zones quickly to avoid
9 substantial tickets. Since the Shuttle Project will make it legal for private shuttles to block public
10 bus stops, the shuttles are likely to stop and idle at the bus stops for longer periods of time.
11 AR1737. This, of course will exacerbate the impacts documented above, including air pollution,
12 blockage of MUNI, pedestrian safety, etc. *Id.*

13 By authorizing activity that is currently illegal, the Shuttle Project will increase adverse
14 impacts above the level of current illegal pirate shuttle operations. This situation is very similar to
15 the case of *Lighthouse Field Beach Rescue v. City of Santa Cruz* (2005) 131 Cal. App. 4th 1170,
16 1197. In that case the City of Santa Cruz proposed to legalize off-leash dog use at a local beach.
17 The City argued that although off-leash dog use was currently illegal, such use was common.
18 Therefore the City argued that the legalization of off-leash dog use would have no significant
19 impact compared to the baseline of illegal dog use. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument and
20 held that by legalizing off-leash dog use, the City’s action was likely to increase the “intensity or
21 rate of use” of the beaches by off-leash dog walkers. The City’s Shuttle Project is no different. By
22 legalizing what was previously illegal, the City’s Project is likely to increase the “intensity or rate of
23 use” of commuter shuttles in the City. CEQA review is necessary to analyze this impact and to
24 propose feasible mitigation measures.

25 **5. The City improperly relied on mitigation measures in concluding the Shuttle
26 Project is categorically exempt.**

27 An agency must decide whether a project is eligible for a categorical exemption as part of its
28 preliminary review of the project, not in the second phase when mitigation measures are evaluated.
Azusa, 52 Cal.App.4th at 1198-1200. Only those projects that have no possibility of a significant
impact on the environment are categorically exempt from CEQA review. *Id.*; *Salmon Protection &
Watershed Network v. County of Marin* (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1108 (“*SPAWN*”). “Reliance
upon mitigation measures (whether included in the application or later adopted) involves an

1 evaluative process of assessing those mitigation measures and weighing them against potential
2 environmental impacts, and that process must be conducted under established CEQA standards and
3 procedures for EIR's or negative declarations." *SPAWN*, 125 Cal.App.4th at 1108. In determining
4 whether the significant effect exception to a categorical exemption exists, "it is the possibility of a
5 significant effect . . . which is at issue, not a determination of the actual effect, which would be the
6 subject of a negative declaration or EIR." *Azuza*, 52 Cal.App.4th at 1200. If a project may have a
7 significant effect on the environment, CEQA review must occur, and only then are mitigation
8 measures relevant. *SPAWN*, 125 Cal.App.4th at 1107.

9 The City erred in relying on mitigation measures (the permit program and dedicated
10 enforcement officers) to grant a categorical exemption from CEQA. The possibility of
11 environmental impacts, such as those acknowledged by the City (AR1107, 1205-1211), necessitates
12 review under CEQA, at which time mitigation measures, such as the permit system and dedicated
13 enforcement officers, and others, may be considered in evaluating the actual environmental impact
14 of the Shuttle Project. Instead, the City improperly included the untested permit program as part of
15 the project, without disclosing the environmental impacts the permits are designed to mitigate, and
16 without allowing the public to propose alternative or additional mitigation measures. Making
17 matters worse, the City admits that the permit mitigation may not be effective:

18 If the pilot does not demonstrate that sharing designated Muni zones with commuter shuttles
19 successfully reduces conflicts and supports commuter shuttle operations, the SFMTA may
20 consider whether any refinements in the approach would address remaining problems, and
21 may consider a second pilot term to test these. If the conclusion is that commuter shuttles
22 and Muni are not compatible at any shared stops, the SFMTA may then consider requiring
23 that commuter shuttles pursue creation of white zones for shuttle stops.

24 AR94-5. Clearly, since the City does not even know if the Project will mitigate the impacts the City
25 admits the project will have, a legitimate question exists about whether the project may have a
26 significant impact, and therefore the agency cannot exempt the project. *See Davidon Homes v. City*
27 *of San Jose* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106, 117.

28 By including unvetted mitigation measures as part of the Shuttle Project, the City has
attempted to conduct "an 'end run' around the governing standards." *Azuza*, 52 Cal.App.4th at
1201. This shortcutting of CEQA requirements subverts the purposes of CEQA by omitting
material necessary to informed decisionmaking and informed public participation. It precludes both
identification of potential environmental consequences arising from the project and also thoughtful
analysis of the sufficiency of measures to mitigate those consequences. The City cannot use a

1 notice of exemption for a project which includes mitigation measures to substitute for an EIR or
2 mitigated negative declaration.

3 **V. CONCLUSION**

4 The Shuttle Project is preempted by State law. Even if it were not, the City may not
5 authorize a transit system comparable to CalTrain with absolutely no CEQA review. Due to the
6 failure of the City to conduct CEQA review, it has avoided its legal duty to impose mitigation
7 measures to reduce the Shuttle Project's significant impacts on air pollution, traffic, pedestrian and
8 bicycle safety, MUNI flow, displacement of low-income communities and other impacts. We
9 respectfully request that the Court hold that San Francisco Transportation Code § 914 is null and
10 void, and set aside the City's CEQA exemption and require the City to prepare a CEQA document
11 to analyze and mitigate the Shuttle Project's impacts.

11 Respectfully submitted,

12 DATED: September 8, 2015

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